LINKING FISCAL STRESS AND SOCIAL EQUITY: A MUNICIPAL TOOLBOX



Austin Aldag, Yuanshuo Xu, Christine Wen, Natassia Bravo & Mark Cassidy



Cornell University: Department of City and Regional Planning

May 10th _

2018 NYSCMA Conference

Ithaca, NY

See more information at http://www.mildredwarner.org/restructuring/fiscal-stress.

Agenda



Context

Tax Cap Research

Lessons from Other States Impacts of the Tax Cap in New York State

Tax Cap Overrides: Who, Where, and Why?



Linking Fiscal Stress & Equity: A Toolbox

Landbanks and Land Trusts

Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILOTs) Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs) Tax Abatements and the Database of Deals



Shared Services in New York State: A Reform That Works

Binghamton, New York Binghamton University (State University of New York) George Homsy, Department of Public Administration

Department of City and Regional Planning Bingxi Qian, Yang Wang and Mildred Warner Cornell University, Ithaca, New York



State Austerity Policy & Creative Local Response

WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT?

WHAT CAUSES LOCAL FISCAL STRESS?

Department of City and Regional Planning Cornell University, Ithaca, New York Austin M. Aldag, Mildred E. Warner

Yunji Kim

University of Wisconsin: Madison Department of Urban and Regional Planning

MAY 2017

TRESS Impact Analysis NY Property Tax Cap

Robert Rivera & Yuanshuo Xu

State Austerity Policy & Creative Local Response

December 2014

TRESS ISCAI

State Austerity Policy & Creative Local Response

Fix the Cap

Austin Aldag and Mildred Warner

February, 2018

STRESS OCAI

State Austerity Policy & Creative Local Response

Hector Chang & Christine Wen Lessons for New York Tax Caps in Other States

December 2014

TRESS


State Austerity Policy & Creative Local Response


A Municipal Toolbox LINKING FISCAL STRESS & SOCIAL EQUITY:

Austin Aldag, Natassia Bravo, Mark Cassidy, Alfie Rayner, & Zach Small

December 2017

What Drives Local Government Fiscal Stress?






Tax Caps in Other States: Lessons for New York

Lax and Expenditure Limitations






Tax Caps in Other States: Lessons for NYS

See more information at http://www.mildredwarner.org/restructuring/fiscal-stress.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Growing Impacts of the Tax Cap





Who is Affected Most by the Tax Cap?




Total Shortfall

-30.0%	27.5%	57.5%	Total
-41.7%	25.9%	67.6%	Village
-33.6%	28.6%	62.2%	Town
-26.6%	27.2%	53.7%	County
-22.8%	26.1%	48.9%	City
Shortfall	Projected	Observed	

- 2.2% average annual property tax increase under cap, 4.2% without
- 30% shortfall in property tax, over \$13 billion loss to NY localities
- Counties would lose 27% and Cities will lose 23% of property tax revenue
- Towns and Villages, who depend more on the property tax, will lose 34% and 42% of property tax revenue

Where is Affected Most by the Tax Cap?






Tax Caps in Other States: Lessons for NYS

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Short Term Impacts: Cuts Under Tax Cap



Major Expenditure Change Per Capita 2012-2015: Counties



-20%


-25%


-30%

Fix the Cap!



Vicious Cycle Under Current Cap Virtuous Cycle if Cap is Fixed





Impacts of Tax Caps



- Tax Caps do not reduce expenditures in the long term
- Tax Caps increase use of revenue sources that are more volatile (user fees) (sales taxes), less transparent (impact fees), and more regressive
- Tax Caps disproportionally affect counties and communities with lower income and smaller populations
- Tax Caps force municipalities to reallocate economic development dollars to maintain mandated services

Fix the Cap!


What Do Other States Do?



- Increase state aid to localities and schools
- Centralize fiscal responsibility for state mandated services
- Exempt infrastructure investment from tax cap
- Exempt emergency or disaster expenses
- Allow simple majority overrides
- Exempt special districts

Desired Reforms to Property Tax Cap





Source: Cornell University, Local Government Fiscal Stress in NYS Survey, 2017, N=878.

Who, Where and Why? Overriding the Tax Cap:

Who is Overriding?




In the last three years, has your jurisdiction overridden the Tax Cap?

Villages	Towns	Counties	Cities	AII	Government Type
34%	39%	43%	43%	38%	% Yes

Source: Cornell University, Local Government Fiscal Stress in NYS Survey, 2017, N=878.

Overriding the Property Tax Cap

CORNELL UNIVERSITY




Why / Why Not Override the Cap?



Why did your jurisdiction decide to **override** the Tax Cap? (N=330)

Why did your jurisdiction **not override** the Tax Cap? (N=548)




Source: Cornell University, Local Government Fiscal Stress in NYS Survey, 2017. Multiple responses allowed

Overriding the Property Tax Cap

Overriding the Tax Cap Summary





More Likely

Less Likely

- Fiscal Stress
- Cutbacks in Road Repair
- Tax-exempt Property
- Pushback Narrative
- Total Services Provided
- % Expenditure Employee Benefits

- NYC Region
- Job Growth
- High Tax Effort
- Believe Narrative of Inefficiency
- Submitted Govt. Efficiency Plan

We want to hear from you!



What reforms would you like to see in the Tax Cap?

Why did your jurisdiction override/not override the Tax Cap?

How has the tax cap affected your jurisdiction?


What Can Local Governments Do?





Sources of Local Fiscal Stress





Linking Stress Sources to Tools



Stress Source

Declining Population
Economic Development
Challenges

Tax-exempt Properties

% Moderate or Significant Source

53%

67%


55%

Tool

Land Banks & Land Trusts

Transparency in Tax Abatements & CBAs

Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILOTs)




A Municipal Toolbox

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Land Banks and Land Trusts

Land Banks





WHAT ARE LAND BANKS?

WHY USE THEM?

HOW DO THEY OPERATE?


ARE THEY
SELF-SUFFICIENT?

WHAT TOOLS DO THEY

USE?

Land Banks & Land Trusts

CORNELL UNIVERSITY



Source: New York State Land Bank Association (2017). NYS Land Banks: A New National Standard.

Land Banks and Equity







Photo Credit:
Syracuse
Community
Land Bank and
Newburgh
Community
Land Bank
(2017)





Land Banks & Land Trusts

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Tax Abatement Data, PILOTs, and Economic Development Challenges: CBAs

House of Cards



Neither bodes well for an economic future. the worst tax structures in the nation.. the State of New York... We have one of Tax is an anti-business environment for




- Political strategy Firm Poaching
- Jobs jobs jobs- easy to point at a job creation number
- Let's check the numbers!

The Great GASB-77



- GASB 77- standard for governments to report tax break dollars (2017)
- Some states require local government to follow GAAP, NYS is not one of them
- Congruency and consistency issues
- No job creation figures
- Improve to allow adequate cost/benefit analysis



NYS- National Lampoon



State:


Metro Area:

	Per (Capita A	Per Capita Abatements		Per	Capita	Per Capita Abatement
New York State	\$	207	42%	Reno	\$	202	2%
Nebraska	⊗	188	4%	New York City	⊗	167	83%
Louisiana	⊗	106	5%	Kansas City	↔	43	2%
Vermont	⊗	87	1%	San Jose	↔	25	1%
Michigan	⊗	82	8%	Las Vegas	⊗	20	1%
Missouri	⊗	80	5%	Houston	↔	20	3%
Connecticut	⊗	47	2%	Chicago	⊗	5	1%
Washington	⊗	44	3%	Los Angeles	⊗	သ	1%
Iowa	⊗	44	1%	Source: Good Jobs First, "Subsidy Tracker 2"	bs Firs	st, "Subsic	ly Tracker 2"
Oklahoma	∽	44	2%				•
Total	↔	30 \$9	30 \$9.7 billion				

See more information at http://www.mildredwarner.org/restructuring/fiscal-stress.

Give it to Me Straight, Doc

GASB - 77 NYS Breakdown





The Biggest Loser



	# Film	# Film - Minimum film or post production activity to qualif
Region	Credits	No individual \$\$
NYC	76%	 Large quantity of projects in city
MSA	90%	 Long existing major film industry cluster in NYC
NVS Total	202	 Very poor ROI and Economic Impact
IDIOI O I NI	707	 Projects will film minimum qualifying time at
Source: Good Jobs First, "Subsidy Tracker ?"	First,	location and post-produce elsewhere
"Subsidy Tracker 2"		

Start me up



- START-UP NY The new Empire Zone
- 75% in NYC
- \$222,800 per job
- 1,135 Total Jobs created
- \$101,000,000 2017 Incentives
- \$54 million 1st Year Advertising
- \$31,000,000 community investment




"Firms are pre-revenue, they are not and should not be concerned with tax rates at this point," -- Caitlin Schickle

Start me up



- START-UP NY The new Empire Zone
- 75% in NYC
- \$222,800 per job
- 1,135 Total Jobs created
- \$101,000,000 2017 Incentives
- \$54 million 1st Year Advertising
- \$31,000,000 community investment



"Firms are pre-revenue, they are not and should not be concerned with tax rates at this point," -- Caitlin Schickle

In All Seriousness



- Tax Abatement is rampant in NYS
- Theory says bad deal, data cannot support conclusions
- Database of Deals Pushed by government watchdogs
- Bi-partisan support
- Specific amounts tax not collected and jobs created
- Did not pass this round of budget
- Continue discussion to improve spending transparency



Two Solutions - PILOTS / CBAs



dollars are not wasted with subsidies and abatements" much easier to deliver services at the local level if these 21% - do they really need all of these tax breaks - would be "If corporations just got a whopping tax cut - from 35% to

Ron Deutsch, Director of Fiscal Policy Institute

- Infrastructure? Housing?
- Shift subsidy from film
- Standardize use of Community Benefit Agreements and PILOTs in conjunction with tax abatements

What is a PILOT?



to compensate for all or part of lost property tax revenue. Voluntary payments made by tax-exempt property owners or users

Goal: Compensate for public services	Goal: Encourage development
NET GAIN	NET LOSS
Contribute when tax- exempt institutions	Avoid paying some or all local property taxes
Service Agreement	Tax Abatement

Framework to Establishing a PILOT



Consistency

Ad-hoc vs. Systematic

Local Government Leverage

Carrot vs. Stick

Timeframe

Short-term vs. Ongoing

Payment Determination

Flexible vs. Specified

Why Establish a PILOT in NYS



1. Local government reliance on property tax revenue

- Property tax is 30% of total revenue for local government in New York
- Property tax is 58% of local revenue for NYS Towns
- PILOTs raise revenue for vital public services

2. Offset tax burden of local residents

- Local property tax rates go up to compensate for tax-exempt property
- Many users of nonprofit services may not be local
- PILOTs directly addresses fiscal stress from a root source

3. Shifting role of non-profits

- Many are regional economic drivers (especially eds and meds)
- Creating increased instead of decreased burden of service provision
- PILOTs create opportunities for collaboration around shared goals between local government and non-profits

Case Studies



	Oswego County (Wind Projects) 2017	Boston (PILOT Program) 2017
Consistency	Systematic	Systematic
Government Leverage	Stick	Carrot
Timeframe	Ongoing	Ongoing
Payment Determination	Full amount of foregone taxes	25% of foregone taxes
Tax-Exempt Property Value	I	\$13.9 Billion
Requested Payment	Full foregone tax amount	\$49.5 Billion
Payment Amount	Full foregone tax amount	\$32.4 million

Services and Community Benefits Agreement



Legal agreement between stakeholders:


Community members, developers, and local government

Offset negative impacts by securing benefits for directly affected residents

Institutions of interest:

- Non-profits
- Eds & Meds
- Renewable energy
- Historic re-development

Tax-exempt Land
Economic Dev.
Challenges



Linking Fiscal Stress & Equity



Tool

Land Banks

Tax Abatement Transparency

PILOTs & CBAs

Result >> Fiscal Stress

Grow and preserve local tax base.

Decrease misused, or wasted, economic development funds.

Align costs of service provision; reduce burden on local government for econ dev.

Result > Equity

Community programming and community land trusts.

Transparency in local spending, and hold government accountable.

New contributions decrease community burden; benefit local community

Thank you





See handout for all publications
All available at www.mildredwarner.org

2018 NYSCMA Conference

CORNELL UNIVERSITY